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Abstract 
Addressing the intersections of economic opportunities and scriptural interpretation, this 
article examines how Buddhist monks involved in the Mongolian gold rush view the ethics of 
mining. Commonly regarded an act of theft and violence within Mahāyāna Buddhism, mining 
is locally subject to strong ethical denunciations. Drawing on historical connections and 
transnational devotional practices, the mining monks engage creatively with a method of 
meditation known as ‘breaking the mind’, which offers a competing way of knowing the 
world. Focusing on the universe within which they conceptualize action, they present a 
radical reinterpretation of ethical human life. I argue that the mining monks’ own conceptual 
framework highlights the analytical importance of attending to not only visible bodily action, 
but also people’s self-reflection in our attempts to understand the place of the ethical in 
human life. 
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The gold mines of Uyanga extend as far as the eye can see. Black lingering exhaust fumes fill 
the air as the industrial excavators, dumper trucks, and front loaders teem along narrow dirt 
tracks between the deep open-pit mines and pools with stagnant green-tinted water. Looking 
across this barren, wind-swept valley on a cold autumn day in 2011, a friend of mine known 
as Batbold, who worked as a mining company supervisor, turned to me and said: “Do you 
remember how a few years ago there used to be thousands of ninjas (ninja) here?” The 
‘ninjas’, he was referring to, were artisanal gold miners who had flocked to Uyanga in such 
numbers that it became known as the country’s ‘ninja capital’ (ninja naryn nislel). Batbold 
continued his reminiscences: 
 
Pre-copyedited version! Final version published in Ethnos 2016. Mette M. High 
Please access it here: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YJvhqgeRKIjkdmR2YI97/full 
 
2 
 
Do you remember how there used to be gers and tents (maihan) everywhere? And 
people had their mining holes and took the dirt down to the river to pan for gold? 
Now almost all the ninjas are gone. They have moved elsewhere. But it isn’t 
because gold is no longer reaching (hüreh) us. We are still finding a lot of gold! It 
is harder, it truly is, and we do need the machinery. It is big business now. Not 
like before! 
 
Batbold lit a cigarette and inhaled deeply before continuing. 
 
Ninjas always talked about how there was no gold, do you remember? But they 
were talking nonsense (demii yum yarih)! Pure nonsense. There is plenty of gold. 
Now that we all have lamas working for us, we just stand there with our water 
jets and you can see the gold in the dirt. Now that every company has a lam 
uurhaich, it is no problem finding gold. 
 
The Mongolian gold rush hit the remote mountainous region of Uyanga around the year 
2000. As it unfolded, Buddhist monks, known locally as lamas (lam), became centrally 
involved in carrying out rituals for ninjas and other gold rush participants. Lamas were often 
consulted to specify auspicious moments for the initial ‘breaking of the soil’ (gazar höndöh). 
When a new mining-hole reached the gold deposit and the ninjas began ‘branching out’ 
(burzaih), lamas were often invited to the site to ‘give offerings’ (örgöl örgöh) to spirit 
beings that were said to hold, if not withhold, the precious metal. If an accident happened, the 
injured ninja was quickly taken to the monastery or the private homes of lamas for the 
‘readings of texts’ (unshlaga unshih). And at times of illness and affliction, lamas were 
usually consulted for advice and treatment. As I have discussed elsewhere (Author 2013a), 
the advent of the gold rush became pivotal to the daily life and liturgy of Uyanga’s religious 
specialists. 
 
But although the village lamas have now been involved in the gold rush for more than a 
decade, the precise nature of this involvement has changed drastically over the years. As 
Batbold commented, the emergence of ‘lam uurhaich’, which can be translated as a ‘mining 
monk’ or a ‘mining lama’, has been particularly consequential. Swopping their maroon and 
amber robes and felt boots for old jeans and Chinese rubber boots, some of the village lamas 
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have now joined the mining companies in the warmer summer months as contract miners. 
Some of them drive the heavy machinery, while others work the high-pressure water jets. At 
the end of the mining season, they return to the monastery to work fulltime as lamas. The first 
time I heard about lam uurhaich was during a stay with one of my host families living on the 
steppe. It was an early morning when my host father initiated a conversation that I was well 
familiar with; a conversation in which he lamented the current state of affairs. The rain had 
not been forthcoming, the grass was not as green and tall as usual, the animals were not 
fattening up. I half-listened to the almost customary lament until he added: “And, now our 
lamas are ‘washing dirt’ (shoroo ugaah)! We, our Uyanga, now have lam uurhaich!” I must 
admit I initially scoffed at this and joined in my host father’s lament. However, when I later 
began fieldwork with the mining lamas, I realized that I had to not only question my own 
readiness to deride the lamas’ direct involvement in mining but also take seriously the ways 
in which the lamas conceptualized and reflected on their own actions. They emerged as far 
from apt instantiations of a Simmelian financialized universe where money come to envelop 
and express our fundamental sense of being (Simmel 1903:104). Earning money from mining 
has not led to the surrender of the lamas’ sense of being to the mediating schema of exchange 
and the quantifiable value of money. Their ‘personal substances’ and collective ‘way of life’ 
have not been extensively homogenized through the prevalent circulation of the money-
mediator so as to abolish their devotional practices and bonds with others. For the mining 
lamas themselves, monetary value and religious virtue are not mutually conflicting and this 
recognition has made them an important, if not unique, asset to the mining companies. 
 
For Batbold and many of the other mining company supervisors, the direct involvement of 
lamas in the mining for gold has transformed the potential of gold mining in the region. In 
their eyes, it is an event that despite years of intense mining has now made gold even more 
accessible and more plentiful. As a result, most mining companies are keen to include 
‘mining lamas’ in their work force and most companies today have at least one lam uurhaich 
working for them. Among the village lamas, however, it is an event that articulates and in 
turn produces growing frictions within an already divided monastic community. It is an 
involvement that highlights generational divides, pitching junior lamas against their seniors, 
bringing to the fore their differing understandings of how one ought to live and act. 
Reflections on and questions about ethical conduct have now become pressing, particularly 
among the lamas themselves. Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 
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2005 and 2011 in and around the monastery of Uyanga (Uyangiin Hiid), I will explore how 
the mining lamas position their mining activities in relation to classic Buddhist teachings and 
draw inspiration from transnational devotional practices. By looking at the intersections of an 
extractive economy and scriptural interpretations, I will show how a creative engagement 
with a Buddhist meditation practice has produced new and unexpected spaces for economic 
opportunities and ethical action in a monastic community. 
 
In anthropology, there has been a concerted interest in ethics in recent years (see Cassaniti 
and Hickman 2014). Embracing different approaches, many of the exponents (e.g. Faubion 
2011, Fassin 2008, Laidlaw 2002, Lambek 2010a, Zigon 2007) place their projects in 
contradistinction to the work and intellectual legacy of Durkheim.
1 
They draw attention to 
how Durkheim effectively aligned ethics with concerns about social norms, regularity, and 
control. Durkheim engaged Kant’s conception of ‘the moral law’ and was interested in why 
rules received sanction and why following them appeared so attractive to people. But whereas 
for Kant (2005[1785]), ‘the moral law’ was a universal and a priori basis for acting in 
accordance with the demands of practical reason, thereby bringing attention to the role of 
reasoning, doubt and free will, Durkheim (2009 [1906]:35-62) saw ‘moral facts’ as socially 
constituted and revealing the particular structures of a society. As a codified representation of 
society, ethics thus became allied with understandings that mandate and motivate collective 
cohesion (Laidlaw 2002:312, 2014:22). 
 
In an attempt to disentangle ethics from this nexus of social structure, power and ideology, 
Michael Lambek has in his recent work approached ethics as a constitutive part of the human 
condition that is grounded in “the complexity and perhaps inconsistency of human action and 
intention” (2010b:9). Approaching ethics as a communicative event, a dialectical movement 
between speech and action, Lambek seeks to move beyond Durkheimian ascriptions of fixity 
and certainty to reposition ethics within the plurality and nonconformity of human action. 
Inspired by Hannah Arendt’s work on vita activa (Arendt 1958), Lambek draws on her 
insights into the unpredictability and irreversibility of action. For Arendt, this underscores the 
importance of promising and forgiving as mitigating faculties. ‘Promising’ reins in the 
unpredictability of action by binding actors to certain courses of events while ‘forgiving’ is a 
remedy against the irreversibility of action by absolving the actor from the unforeseen 
consequences of his/her deeds. This part of Arendt’s work contemplates the possibilities for 
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what she calls a “practical politics” (1958:5): Possibilities for human beings to come together 
and act in concert when each one of them has the capacity to act and start something new of 
their own. In Lambek’s exposition, however, her theory of action is considered in isolation 
from her work on vita contemplativa and the three faculties of thinking, willing and judging 
(Arendt 1971, 1982); capacities for contemplation and self-understanding that would seem so 
central to an action-based theory of ethics.
2
 Lambek turns instead to JL Austin’s theory of 
speech acts and argues that it is the act of “speaking [that] entails and generates criteria” for 
ethical judgment (2010c:43). As such, it is through utterances that agents are manifested and 
disclosed (ibid.:51, see also 2015:129). Rather than valorizing the complexities and perhaps 
inconsistencies in contemplative life, ‘action’ becomes coterminous with ‘interaction’. As a 
result, actions of the mind become relevant only in so far as they seek to engage other actors 
– acts by which “I accuse, command, condemn, confess, congratulate, criticize” (Lambek 
2010c:51) to name just a few. But how are we to make sense of those forms of action that do 
not disclose themselves primarily through social relations and human speech?
3
 That is, 
without implying some solitary process of self-understanding as Webb Keane mockingly 
presents (Keane 2010:82), how are we to make sense of the ethical independently of that 
which is spoken? 
 
Rather than privileging familiar grammars, I suggest we take our starting point in 
acknowledging the diverse ways in which people comprehend and construct the world as a 
conceptual entity; that is to say, the particular epistemological constructions that people 
generate and favour. In the works by James Faubion (2011) and James Laidlaw (2014), 
palaces and farm houses, weather conditions and statistical calculations become actors that 
impinge on and influence human self-constitution and expression. This contingence affects 
legal and quotidian understandings of human agency, responsibility, and accountability. In an 
apt example offered by Laidlaw (2010:151), a sudden wind catches the curtains in a window, 
making them knock over a vase that falls on a passer-by’s head. Here, a distributed chain of 
cause and effect reminds us that agency, responsibility, and accountability need not reside 
within a single individual, or indeed even a human being. In this article, I suggest that we 
need to ask not only to which entity we ascribe responsibility. We need to also ask the bigger 
question of what kind of conceptual totality people see themselves and their various others to 
be acting in. Rather than promoting a totalizing theoretical holism (Bubandt and Otto 
2010:6), it is a call to recognize people’s own reflections on the holistic epistemological 
Pre-copyedited version! Final version published in Ethnos 2016. Mette M. High 
Please access it here: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YJvhqgeRKIjkdmR2YI97/full 
 
6 
 
conditions of their existence. It is to ask: What kind of universe do people consider 
themselves and their others to be part of? The universe, understood here in its widest sense, is 
not necessarily one that is familiar to us. It is not necessarily one that we can presume to 
know. And this is something that has become central to the ethical understandings of gold 
mining, and human conduct more generally, among the village lamas of Uyanga. 
 
 
Buddhist ethics 
In Mahāyāna Buddhism, of which Mongolian Buddhism forms a part, the universe is seen to 
comprise multiple kinds of beings who all have Buddha as their shared teacher. Some of 
these beings are blissful gods reaping the fruits of past deeds. Others are violent demigods 
obsessed with wrath, pride, and jealousy. Again others are human beings, sharing the same 
physical world as animals and others. However, all these beings are not equally positioned to 
achieve the ultimate goal of freedom from suffering. Whereas beings born into lower realms 
are said to be driven by their delusive passions and desires, hence unable to rein in their 
untamed minds, humans are endowed with a rare and precious consciousness (oyuun uhaan, 
Pa. viññāṇa) that enables actions of mindfulness, restraint, and compassion. In contrast to 
other beings, humans have obtained, what the Dalai Lama describes as, “the best form of 
existence for the practice of the Dharma” (1994:39).4 As one of Uyanga’s lamas explained: 
 
We are very fortunate to be human. Many beings don’t have this high 
level of rebirth (deed törölt). Do you know how rare it is? Imagine an 
ocean, stretching as far as the eye can see. It is bad weather – it is 
windy and the waves rise very tall. On this ocean there is something 
floating, something like a life buoy (avrah tsagirag). It is thrown 
around by the waves. It doesn’t lie still. Then imagine a blind sea 
turtle (dalain yast melhii) - it can’t see what is above or below it. It 
just swims in the ocean and pops its head up once in a while. A 
human rebirth is as likely as this blind sea turtle popping its head up 
right into the life buoy.
5
 
 
Reflecting on this exceptional rebirth of humans, the lama then added that we humans were 
probably one of the only beings that could carry out intentional action, that is, action that is 
Pre-copyedited version! Final version published in Ethnos 2016. Mette M. High 
Please access it here: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YJvhqgeRKIjkdmR2YI97/full 
 
7 
 
grounded in volition (zorilgoor, sanaatai).
6
 Such intentional actions are not only manifested 
outwardly through body and speech, but also inwardly through thoughts, desires, and 
emotions. All of these actions are central to progressing along the Hutagtyn Naiman Mör, or 
the Noble Eightfold Path, offering the way to the cessation of suffering. The lama slowly and 
carefully began listing its eight components: 
1. Zöv üzel (right view) 
2. Zöv uhaan (right intention) 
3. Zöv üg (right speech) 
4. Zöv üil (right action) 
5. Zöv amdral (right livelihood) 
6. Zöv hicheel zütgel (right effort) 
7. Zöv durdal (right mindfulness) 
8. Zöv samadi7 (right concentration) 
He explained how all eight practices had to flow together, just like the nearby Ongi River 
(Ongiin gol). Rather than one drop of water being more important than another, all the drops 
come together and support each other in flowing the right way. But, he noted, although we 
humans are capable of acting intentionally, it is no guarantee for ethically sound action. As 
opposed to drops of water, we humans can intentionally commit sins (nügel) and stray away 
from the path. He emphasized how in the teachings of the Buddha, the human ability to 
distinguish and carry out good deeds was not restricted to or predicated on a particular 
Buddhist understanding of the world. It was also not presented as exclusive to the religious 
devout. Instead, the fundamental pillars of ethical life were shared by all of humankind 
regardless of personal faith, conviction, and practice. 
 
As he made this point, he recited the sutra known as the Kālāma Sutta. Here, Buddha meets 
the villagers of Kālāmas in present-day Bihar, India. The villagers have received countless 
visits by other religious teachers who all have propounded their own doctrines and sought to 
tear down the doctrines of others. The Kālāmas are left deeply confused and approach 
Buddha in the hope that he might be able to advise them on how to live their lives in a 
morally proper way. After reassuring them that their state of confusion is completely 
understandable, he says to them: 
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Come, Kālāmas. Do not go by oral tradition, by lineage of teaching, 
by hearsay, by a collection of scriptures, by logical reasoning, by 
inferential reasoning, by reflection on reasons, by the acceptance of a 
view after pondering it, by the seeming competence of a speaker, or 
because you think, ‘The ascetic is our teacher’. But when you know 
for yourselves, ‘These things are wholesome, these things are 
blameless; these things are praised by the wise; these things, if 
undertaken and practised will lead to welfare and happiness’, then 
you should engage in them (Thera and Bodhi 2011:66). 
 
In the rest of the sutra, Buddha leads the Kālāmas to the realization that greed, hatred, and 
delusion lead to harm and suffering for oneself and others. Concluding that they should 
therefore abandon such actions, the villagers rejoice in the restitution of their moral clarity. In 
this teaching, Buddha shows how a life of reflection and moral restraint brings its own 
intrinsic rewards of happiness and wellbeing - whether or not people recognize the karmic 
laws of existence, another life after death, or the possibility of final liberation. Simply by 
taking up human bodily form, the Kālāmas are seen to possess the intellectual capacity to 
recognize and valorize the fundamental ethical distinctions that are central to Buddhist 
practice.
8
 It is thus by virtue of our consciousness rather than our faith that we can see the 
truth of the teachings. 
 
In a country where the Buddhist establishment was aggressively repressed through decades of 
Soviet socialist anti-religious campaigns and reinstated in only 1991 (Kaplonski 2008, 2012), 
it is not surprising that the lama chose to recite this particular sutra. This is a region where 
people were not able to devote themselves openly and freely to Buddhist practice for several 
decades. It is also a region where lamas and laity continue to look towards Inner Mongolia, 
Tibet and India in particular for what they deem to be ‘authentic’ (jinhene) and ‘true’ (zöv 
ünen) practice. It was not long ago that one of the older village lamas worked as a math 
teacher at the local school and later as an accountant for a small company. And that one of 
the other older lamas struggled to hold down a steady job at the negdel (herding collective) 
due to his penchant for vodka. Today’s older generation of lamas all have extensive personal 
histories that connect them to mundane jobs and ordinary lives independently of their extant 
Buddhist devotion. With an ethics that is grounded in the capacity for reflection rather than 
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years of devotion, these older lamas are today generally much respected by the laity. 
Although they have only been able to practice openly in their adult years, their personal 
struggles, efforts and courage seem central to their present positions as ‘moral exemplars’ 
(Humphrey 1997:34, Atwood 2004:325). Some members of the laity remember how several 
lamas practiced in ‘secret’ despite facing the risk of imprisonment, if not death by shooting. 
Others assisted them in hiding old Tibetan books, silk wall hangings, and brass paraphernalia 
from the authorities. When the monastery of Uyanga was rebuilt in 1991, it was a major 
effort that was led by this older generation of lamas. They reinvigorated ritual traditions, 
reinstated ceremonial calendars, and re-launched the recruitment of novices. Addressed by 
the laity with the honorary title of bagsh (‘teacher’), they are now generally regarded as 
central to the “professional rationalization of ethics” (Lambek 2010b:3). Given this position, 
they readily voice their damning charges if and when fundamental Buddhist tenets are being 
challenged. With the onset of the Mongolian gold rush around the year 2000, this older 
generation of lamas has become particularly vociferous. 
 
 
The flourishing of ignorance 
It all started around 1993 when the Mongolian mining company Erel began mining for gold a 
few kilometers from the village. This event marked the transformation of Uyanga into ‘a 
place where people only live for themselves’, as an elderly herder put it – into ‘a place where 
nature (baigal) suffers’. Erel diverted and set up dams on the local river, which shortened its 
course and made the water undrinkable for people and animals living downstream. Erel used 
the river water for its water jets, which it directed at the gold-bearing valley floors. The 
resulting slurry was led through sluice boxes and tall heaps of waste tailings were left behind. 
Industrial diggers slowly worked their way up the valleys, followed by ninjas who arrived in 
their thousands and started panning the waste tailings for leftover gold. Eventually the gold-
content of the tailings was so minimal that many ninjas began the hard work of prospecting 
and digging new mining holes using only hand-made metal picks. They hauled the sacks of 
gravel to the surface and transported them to the nearby river for panning. After 10 years 
most ninjas have moved to new areas and the valleys are now being dug up predominantly by 
so-called huul’ bus kompanuud, that is: ‘Illegal companies’. These companies are called 
‘illegal’ because they operate without an official mining license. Also, they are not selling the 
excavated gold to the official gold buyer, which is the Bank of Mongolia based in the capital 
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city of Ulaanbaatar. Lastly, they are also not paying income taxes or royalties on their 
discoveries. In a country where denoting an activity as ‘illegal’ does not necessarily entail a 
value judgment, the local reference to this latest wave of mining companies is more a 
statement of facts than a moral criticism (see also Roitman 2005:189).  [insert photo] 
 
Caption: ‘Illegal companies’ working in the gold mines of Uyanga, Mongolia (photo taken by 
the author, August 2011) 
 
Among many of the village lamas, gold mining is seen as an incredibly dangerous activity. 
This is partly because gold is one of the so-called ‘nine jewels’ (yösön erdene). These include 
pearl, coral, turquoise, lapis lazuli, mother of pearl, steel, copper, silver, and gold. In 
Mongolia’s past, these gems were ground up and used as pigments to handwrite Buddhist 
texts, thereby representing the gem-like quality of Buddha’s teachings (see Zhengyin 
2003:618). Given this particular use, gold is today often described as ‘a very special and 
precious treasure that is connected to the gods’. 
 
This connection, however, is more than one of symbolic representation. As I have discussed 
elsewhere (Author 2013a), gold is also seen to be ‘held’ (barih), if not ‘withheld’ (tatgalzah), 
by powerful spirit beings known as lus that dwell in and around water sources. As in the 
regional literature on Tibetan protective deities known as ‘treasure guards’ (de Nebesky-
Wojkowitz 1956:253), lus are said to have adorned their dwelling places with gold. 
Staircases, walls, and floors are all made of gold, as is their armor if they have any. 
Sometimes they protect themselves with gold shields or brandish swords made of gold. At 
other times they drink from gold cups or curl themselves around enormous gold nuggets. In 
order for humans to obtain gold without ‘stealing’ from lus, it is therefore necessary to first 
try to persuade them to part with their treasure. If humans fail to do this, lus are likely to get 
angry and might inflict calamities such as illnesses and accidents. Desiring a metal that is so 
closely guarded and so destructive to extract, gold mining is considered a hulgain hereg, 
meaning ‘an act of theft’, potentially giving rise to a dogshin baidal, which can be translated 
as a ‘state of violence’. Gold mining is considered a dangerous activity that entails a 
fundamental disregard of other beings. 
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Yet, lamas recognize that this human disregard for others is not necessarily intentional. 
Although human beings within Buddhist cosmology enjoy an exceptional rebirth where 
intentionality is one of our distinguishing features, it does not necessarily direct all of our 
actions. Indeed, sometimes Uyanga’s miners are seen to be incapable of controlling what they 
do. In the region, the gold rush is described as a kind of centripetal force that pulls (tatah) 
people in. “We can’t move away from the mines”, a ninja once commented when she and her 
husband failed to move back to the steppe. “Every time we try, we are pulled back” 
(tatagdah). She made a fist and pulled it strongly in a direct line towards her body. Batbold, 
mentioned in the opening vignette, similarly felt that there was “a strong thing” (hüchtei yum) 
in Uyanga. Placed in opposition to this force, miners are often described as ‘having little 
strength’ (chadal bagatai). This severance of action from intention is said to be a 
manifestation of the so-called altny chadvar, meaning ‘the power of gold’. Now flourishing 
in Uyanga, this is an invisible substance that is said to emerge when people extract the heavy 
and dangerous gold. Given its invisibility, the materiality of altny chadvar is little known but 
some people describe it as a sort of ‘invisible dust’ (haragdahgüi shoroo) that rubs off gold 
during the process of extraction. When people come into contact with this, an ‘illness’ 
(övchin) spreads among its victims; an illness that has one dominant symptom: Namely, an 
obsessive longing or greed for the precious metal. 
 
Important for this discussion, Marilyn Strathern (1997:142) has observed that actions that are 
carried out unconsciously, for example under the influence of sorcery, are often not subject to 
the same moral evaluation as conscious actions. In this sense, unconscious actions may be 
regarded as amoral rather than immoral. This is also the case in Uyanga where the potential 
presence of altny chadvar unsettles any quick and easy denunciation of miners’ actions. 
Rather than mining being a clear act of human volition, altny chadvar is deemed partly 
responsible for the continuation of the mining boom. However, it does not relieve miners of 
the moral judgment as to why they decided to join the gold rush in the first place. Indeed, it 
only intensifies the question. Why did they decide to go to the mines in search of this 
precious treasure connected to both gods and lus when altny chadvar makes it so hard to 
leave the mines again? Why are people willing to risk the loss of their own strength by 
joining the gold rush? 
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Many miners deflect such questions by emphasizing that the potential interaction with and 
influence of nonhuman forces in human life is part of the conditions of human existence. 
Whether or not you are a miner, your ‘strength’ (chadal) is always subject to the ebbs and 
flows of fortune and other forces (Humphrey and Ujeed 2012). Rather than being discrete and 
separable, fixed and defensible, it is subject to much speculation and sense-making. As such, 
the illness-inflicting invisible dust of altny chadvar is seen to exemplify more generally the 
dangers and demands that are placed on people when they try to make a living. 
 
For many village lamas, however, miners are not really trying to make a living. Instead they 
are perceived often to spend their money in ways that lead to waste, indulgence, if not 
violence (Author 2013b). In voices of exasperation, lamas told me how they wished miners 
would spend their earnings differently. If only they would spend it on basic provisions such 
as food, shelter, or clothing, they would lament. Then mining could perhaps bring something 
good. But with seemingly constant village-wide drinking binges and fights, many lamas 
insisted that gold mining was ‘completely unnecessary’ (ogt hereggüi) for people. One of the 
senior lamas in the village, known as Budlam, had lost one of his sons in a drunken brawl and 
was a particularly fervent critic of the mining boom.
9
 Having just returned from a much 
anticipated wedding involving the son of a mining company boss and a local villager, 
Budlam, still in a drunken daze, reflected, 
 
Human beings can live as long as they have water and air. If the air 
disappears or gets polluted, humans will die. That’s the end. If the 
water disappears or gets polluted, humans will also die. All living 
things will come to an end. So then, water and air are more precious 
than gold. Gold isn’t necessary for humans. It will lead to our 
extinction (möhöld hüreh). 
 
He paused before continuing, 
 
Our Uyanga has become a place of mining, a place of gold. But we 
lamas can’t accept (zövshöörch chaddaggüi) the mining. It’s so 
wrong! It’s a sin (nügel) committed by people who think only of 
themselves. This mining is leading humanity (hünii yas, lit. the bones 
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of humans) to its own destruction. And, even some of our own lamas 
are now mining. They are searching for gold too! They are destroying 
themselves and destroying the universe (yertönts)! This isn’t right. 
 
People here have become ignorant (munhag). They are trying to make 
Buddhist philosophy easier for their own lives. Ignorance is when a 
person tries to make it suit his life. But this is impossible. You can’t 
change Buddhist philosophy because it has been tested through 
thousands of years. Manipulating this science is ignorance. 
 
Many of Uyanga’s lamas are now concerned that the flourishing of ignorance has entered the 
monastery itself. In a region where none of the lamas have taken the vows of monkhood, 
there is no monastic discipline or moral code (sahilga, Pa. vinaya) to which they must adhere 
and accordingly, no formal sanctions when they are seen to stray (see also Bareja-Starzynzka 
and Havnevik 2006:221). With no possibility for disrobing lamas, there is no enforced 
orthopraxis that can lend the monastic community its unity and harmony. By taking part in 
the gold rush, the mining lamas are thus accused of disregarding not only the content of the 
teachings, but also enforcing conflict within the local monastic community. 
 
 
Lam uurhaich 
One of the village lamas involved in the gold mining is Mönherdene – Budlam’s oldest son. 
Mönherdene joined Uyanga monastery in the mid1990s and had always wanted to become a 
lama. As a child, he used to steal glances of his father’s strange-looking texts and eagerly 
awaited the moment when he was allowed to ring the bell during recitations to summon the 
gods. Initially he spent the mornings at the village school and the afternoons studying the 
texts together with the other novices at the monastery. When he finally graduated from 
school, he made the transition to fulltime lama by joining his father and other lamas in the 
daily recitation of texts at the monastic ‘meetings’ (hural). A few years ago he married his 
long-term girlfriend and they moved to their own ger in his father’s compound half a mile 
from the monastery. Soon thereafter they had their first child – a scenario that is common 
among Mongolian lamas. Drawing on his personal contacts, Mönherdene then asked a mining 
company supervisor for work. Having some experience driving regular cars, he was offered a 
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job the following spring as a dump truck driver, hauling dirt from the open-pit gold mine. He 
explained to me how he wanted this job in order to make some much-needed money for his 
family. As a junior lama, he received a monthly salary of only 60’000MNT (approx. 50USD), 
roughly half of his father’s base salary from the monastery. Moreover, junior lamas were 
rarely invited to carry out personal readings or participate in ritual events outside the 
monastery, which provided more senior lamas with a substantial additional income. Before I 
first met Mönherdene, Budlam described his son’s arrangement to me. He had just returned 
from the mines where he had done extensive readings together with two other village lamas 
at the request of a troubled mining company owner in significant debt. In a tired and 
exhausted voice, Budlam explained: 
 
Our son does readings at the monastery. But he can’t be a lama with a 
wife and child on such a low income. It’s hard. So he goes to the 
mines in the summer and doesn’t attend our meetings. If he doesn’t 
have any other jobs this winter, he might try to come back to the 
monastery and read with me again. But he might also find that he 
can’t be a lama anymore. 
 
The mining company pays Mönherdene a monthly salary of 300’000MNT (approx. 250USD) 
and has mentioned potential pay increases as his skills and experience improve. Since there 
are few other jobs available in the region and hardly any that will offer that kind of salary, 
Mönherdene considers himself lucky to have landed a job in the mines – even if it has given 
rise to many clashes with his parents and senior lamas at the monastery. 
 
It is not unusual in Mongolia for lamas to take up paid employment to supplement their 
income from monasteries (Kollmar-Paulenz 2003:23). According to the lama administering 
the monastery in Uyanga (da lam), there were about 60 initiates between 2000 and 2010. He 
estimated that about half of them have since left the monastery in order to take up other forms 
of employment. Of the remaining 30 or so junior lamas, some still live with their parents and 
siblings, managing to get by on their meagre salary. However, for those who have married, it 
has been necessary to find additional sources of income in order to support their wives and 
children. Yet, when the gold rush began around the year 2000, the lamas did not join the rush. 
And when I conducted fieldwork in the mines with ninjas in 2005 and 2006, I did not meet or 
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hear of any lam uurhaich. According to the da lam, in those years junior lamas mostly sought 
employment as drivers or contract herders. However, in recent years, with more than 30 
‘illegal companies’, each company having approximately 20 employees working 5-7 days a 
week, the mining companies have now become key employers for married junior lamas in 
Uyanga. 
 
One day Mönherdene took me on a trip through the mines and showed me his truck. He had 
decorated the inside of the cab with blue silk scarves (hadag) and hung talismans of guardian 
spirits (sahius sahigch) from the rearview mirrors. He had also glued a small plate of incense 
(utlaga) to the truck’s dashboard and taped a handwritten mantra above the front driver’s 
door. This, he explained, was to ensure that his mind stayed on the ‘right’ (zöv) path and to 
ward off the unwanted forces that he deemed omnipresent in the area. As he said, 
 
If you are not careful when you mine, bad things will happen. Many 
people are not careful so I have to protect myself. 
 
A particular concern for Mönherdene was the presence of altny chadvar. Given the 
importance of consciousness for his Buddhist practice as a lama, the affliction of altny 
chadvar would be detrimental to his future in the monastery. Once, in a serious tone, he 
admitted that if ever afflicted, his father would be right – then he would not be able to return 
to the monastery. Like Mönherdene, other lam uurhaich also actively seek to protect 
themselves and have similarly furnished their front loaders, diggers, and trucks. Working in 
an area where acts of violence and theft against other beings are said to flourish, evidence of 
the dangers involved in mining is plentiful. Only a few weeks earlier a man operating a 
digger died under a landslide. The miners saw this as evidence of lus punishing humans for 
their wrongdoings. According to Mönherdene, several of his lay co-workers do not display 
appropriate respect for lus. Instead of engaging lus through caring and good thoughts, 
through beckoning and propitiating them to part with their treasure, Mönherdene described 
how the miners triumphantly mine the ground and celebrate the gold coups. They dare each 
other to excavate further into the caving hillsides and dig deeper craters. In his view, these 
careless challenges are meant to test not only the miners’ courage and the limits of the 
dangerous mining landscape but also the angered lus. “Lus nüdgüi”, he said – meaning, ‘lus 
have no eyes’. With lus attacking randomly or blindly, it does not necessarily take its anger 
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out on the perpetrator. Instead it may attack anyone who has crossed the perpetrator’s path. In 
a busy working environment where people work closely together, it means that dangers are 
imminent, also for the mining lamas. 
 
Although the senior lamas are also involved in the gold rush, they make a key distinction 
between their own involvement and that of their juniors: The younger generation at the 
monastery has sought a source of income that is predicated not on appeasing but angering lus. 
Instead of respecting other beings, it entails causing them harm. This is an ethical distinction 
that for the senior lamas renders the generated income sinful and emblematic of a straying 
mind, that is, a mind that harbors wrong and harmful thoughts. As such, the bodily actions of 
mining are entangled with the physical object of money as well as the contemplative faculty 
of mind. While the mining company supervisors applaud the junior lamas for helping them to 
make gold more accessible, the senior lamas condemn the juniors’ willingness, if not 
eagerness, to work for the mining companies. Rather than respecting the multiple beings with 
whom humans co-exist, they are seen to act as if they were ‘free’ (chölöötei) and the universe 
was ‘empty’ (hooson), as if their actions entailed no interaction. But how is it possible to 
embrace such a detached and autonomous view of being only to actively seek a return to the 
monastery six months later to join the senior lamas in the daily readings? 
 
 
Creative orthodoxy 
There is a cluster of Mahāyāna writings that endorse a radical reinterpretation of Buddhist 
ethics.
10
 These writings present ethics as conditional on how far humans have progressed on 
their spiritual path. The further they have progressed, the more they morally can, and indeed 
should, do – even to the extent of committing acts of violence. Buddhist scholar Paul 
Williams notes how “we may not always like the fact that Mahāyāna Buddhism permits 
killing, but the texts are there and are as much part of Buddhism as a historical phenomenon 
as are the acts themselves” (2009:164-165). In these Mahāyāna texts, ethics becomes a 
flexible and debatable issue that depends not only on whether or not someone is human, but 
also what kind of human. 
 
Although these Mahāyāna texts have been central to various transgressive Buddhist practices 
(Harvey 2001:141-146, Jones 2008:80, Victoria 2006:225), Mönherdene and other lam 
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uurhaich in Uyanga do not appeal to these texts when considering the ethics of their actions. 
They do not consider themselves to have progressed so far on the spiritual path that they can 
embrace a revised code of ethics. Instead they have delved into the realm of consciousness 
and begun to engage broader questions of Buddhist metaphysics. 
 
We were in the mines when Mönherdene encircled his body with the fragrant smoke of 
burning juniper incense (arts) and said, 
 
I know you probably don’t meet many lamas mining. But you know 
what? In Buddhism the main principle is that everything depends on 
karma. Man carries out actions through the body, through the tongue, 
and through the mind. You have to distinguish between these actions 
because they are not all the same. Remember, it is only the sin that is 
done by the mind that is heavy and serious. This is because the mind 
is like the ‘Tsar’ in Russia. What really matters is the mind. 
 
Conceptualizing actions of the mind as having greater karmic consequences than actions of 
the body and the tongue, Mönherdene and the other mining lamas strive to ensure that their 
mind stays on the ‘right’ (zöv) path and is not clouded by the poisonous forces that they see 
burgeoning in the mines. To achieve this, they draw on the insights of a fellow village lama 
who has journeyed far away from Uyanga and become a so-called ‘high sutra lama’ (deed 
hölgönii lam). 
 
In the early 1990s, a boy called Amartüvshin joined the monastery alongside numerous other 
boys from local families. Elderly lamas quickly noticed how gifted he was. Amartüvshin 
acquired the Tibetan phonetics at an impressive speed and studied the texts with apparent 
ease and deep interest. Yearning for a more rigorous environment, he left after a few years for 
Ulaanbaatar where he joined the newly established monastery Pethub Stangey Choskhor Ling 
Hiid, founded by the late reincarnate lama Kushok Bakula Rinpoche from Ladakh. In contrast 
to most other Mongolian monasteries, this monastery places particular emphasis on the strict 
adherence to moral precepts. It follows a monastic regulatory framework consisting of 253 
vows known as Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya. In the year 2000 the Rinpoche decided at the age 
of 83 to return to India and he invited Amartüvshin along. When the Rinpoche passed away 
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three years later, Amartüvshin sought to join the monastery where his teacher had received 
his education in the 1920s and 1930s. But due to Chinese government control, Amartüvshin 
could not enter the institution in Lhasa and travelled instead to a Tibetan refugee settlement 
in South India where one of the subdivisions of the monastery is located: The Drepung 
Gomong Monastery, which is one of the most influential monasteries for the advanced study 
of Tibetan Buddhist texts and meditation practice. Amartüvshin is still based at the monastery 
in South India and occasionally returns to Uyanga. His visits are surrounded by huge 
anticipation and excitement. Large prayer ceremonies, lavish celebrations, and focused 
meditation classes are held. And it was during one such visit in the summer of 2006 that 
Mönherdene and the other lam uurhaich began to learn more about the doctrines of 
Yogācāra, or what they call ‘the method of breaking the mind’ (setgeliin nomhotgolyn 
arga)
11: A meditation practice that they say ‘break in’, ‘tame’ or ‘pacify’ the unruly animal-
like mind until it accepts its rider. 
 
That summer Amartüvshin held a week-long course in meditation involving a series of 
preliminary exercises that were intended to assist the interested village lamas in establishing 
the right frame of mind. Since meditation practice is not usually part of the monastic day in 
Uyanga, he was said to have focused on the classic Tibetan Buddhist text called Stages of 
Meditation by Kamalaśīla (Tib. sGom Rim, Skt. Bhāvanākrama). It is a three-part text, which 
describes how a spiritual path can be developed in the mind of a meditator. On the very last 
day of his teaching, he was said to have introduced the village lamas to a brief versified text 
which is one of the fundamental texts for Yogācāra practice (“Thirty Verses on 
Consciousness Only” by Vasubandhu, Skt. Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā). One of the other lam 
uurhaich known as Gansüh described to me how the insights of the text immediately 
resonated with him but Amartüvshin’s visit was already coming to an end. Left without a 
teacher to introduce him to more Yogācāra reflections, Gansüh studied the ‘Thirty Verses’ 
and some of its commentaries largely on his own. Eventually, when Amartüvshin returned 
the following year, he was said to have added other Yogācāra texts and a concerted group of 
devotees began to form. However, with Amartüvshin only making brief and occasional visits, 
the devotees received limited guidance in their fervent study and application of insights. This 
absence of a teacher opened up a novel devotional space in which the novices engaged and 
applied their committed practice. 
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Gansüh began gold mining around year 2010. His son was approaching 2 years of age and his 
wife was pregnant with their second child. Like Mönherdene, Gansüh needed to earn more 
money for his family than he was receiving from the monastery. For Gansüh, gold mining 
became an occasion for training his mind. “I’m just a low sutra lama”, he explained. “I can’t 
work with my mind all the time”. So when he left his compound in the early morning and 
drove across the river to the mining valleys, he began various meditation exercises. He told 
me how he reflected on how it is that we know things and why we cling on to our 
‘interpretations’ (tailbar) so much so that we ‘mistake’ (anduurah) our own projections of 
the world for the world itself. He did not question whether or not gold really existed. Rather, 
he questioned the desire, grasping, clinging and longing for gold and the way in which such 
experiences affected his perceptions of actions surrounding gold. For him, gold mining 
seemed to habitually bring into being a world of interpretation in which there were ‘two 
things’ (hoyor yum) on opposite sides: him and gold, miners and the land, company bosses 
and money. “Always two things” (dandaa hoyor yum), he said emphatically. When mining 
for gold, it was tempting to interpret ‘humans’ (hümüüs) as pitched against gold and its 
associated entanglements (alt malt). Echoing the words of a Yogācāra scholar, it is a scenario 
in which “individual beings are caught in the dual appearances of an observer and an 
observed, a ‘knower’ and what is ‘known’” (Devenish 2012:13). Gansüh thus tried to 
question his own desire, grasping, clinging and longing, and reflected on the obstacles that 
prevented him from seeing the ‘true conditions of human life’. Or, as he put it, ‘the complete 
truth’ (tögs ünen): A truth that did not involve such dual confrontations. 
 
Significant for this article, a key contributor to these false interpretations is language: 
Yogacārins contend that “language never directly refers to anything but itself” (Lusthaus 
2013:29). It is a system of self-referentiality and self-closure where “the act of reference 
operates by foisting the illusion that what is being referred to ‘exists’ outside the realm of 
language” (ibid:58). That is to say, when we make use of language, we effectively alter and 
distort our perceptual stream, engaging in a phenomenological reduction that creates, often 
imperceptibly, ’objects’ as if they existed outside of consciousness, as if there was a world of 
permanence. Grammars are considered central to this illusion. When sharing a grammar with 
others, we participate in a system that extends beyond ourselves. Grammars are not subject to 
the spatio-temporal limitations of any individual nor our emotional or experiential states. For 
those unaware, our adoration of language can consequently give rise to the illusion of all 
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things, including our-selves, as having a permanence and unconditionality that we find 
comforting and reassuring, desirable and pleasurable. Rather than generating and instantiating 
ethical criteria as Lambek (2010a) suggested, language in the abstract (grammar and 
semantics) as well as in its ordinary use (pragmatics) is here considered a potential obstacle 
to critical awareness and ethical judgment. But this does not mean that Yogacārins are 
promoting silence or an alternative language. Instead Yogacārins contend that it is crucial to 
critically reflect on and be constantly aware of how we use language. Otherwise our language 
use will merely reinforce self-centered desires and attachments, inhibiting us from ever 
overturning our erroneous interpretations of the world. By engaging in meditation, coming to 
understand the world as having no enduring or finite elements set in opposition to each other, 
it is said that we will be able to experience, through our awareness, things as they really are 
(Pa. tathatā, often translated as ‘such-ness’). 
 
This meditative focus is central to how Gansüh, Mönherdene and the other lam uurhaich 
envision the ethical pillars in their lives. For them, what happens in their minds, escaping the 
notice of others, is central to the karma they accrue. Following vows, observing customary 
rules, and taking part in monastic routines will not lead them further on their path without 
them also understanding how the world truly is. A lama can refrain from taking life but as 
long as his mind ‘runs like a horse’ (aduu shig güih) and creates projections of an 
unconditional permanent universe, he has not progressed on his path. He remains caught 
within a false reality of self-centered misperception. Instead of focusing narrowly on the 
ethical merits of particular actions, Gansüh, Mönherdene and the others consider the real 
ethical work to reside in the conceptual totality that they create for themselves. If they 
unknowingly endorse the dualist tendency of human perception, they will not be able to judge 
the ethics of human conduct and instead continue to feed a self-centric view of human 
existence. 
 
While the Yogācāra doctrine concerns a broad range of fundamental epistemological 
questions, Uyanga’s lam uurhaich engage mostly issues surrounding developing this so-
called ‘right view’. I suggest that this is partly a reaction to the devotional practices of the 
older lamas at the monastery. For Mönherdene, the older lamas including his own father 
place too much emphasis on actions of the body and the tongue. As a result, they not only 
privilege the human body and language as the main vehicles through which we carry out 
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actions, but also ignore the relationship between bodily action, language and perception. This, 
he lamented, lead to a marginalization of that which is significant about the human state of 
being: namely, our consciousness. Rather than engaging in acts of violence and theft, he 
considers his mining actions to also involve powerful meditation, which creates spaces of 
continuity rather than confrontation – spaces where the miner and the land cannot be 
presumed to be opposed or even separate. As Mönherdene explained, 
 
In the old days, when people meditated a lot and their mind became 
pure, they could walk to India on foot in only three days. Or get to the 
top of mountains, like the one over there, in just three steps. They 
could walk faster than wild horses. They could walk faster than cars. 
They would simply close their eyes and call forth the places they 
wanted to reach. They would get there simply by seeing them with 
their eyes, by thinking about them. That’s because nature is empty. 
There is nothing. So with their mind, they could pull it, roll it, and set 
foot on it. Now there’s no one like that in Mongolia! They have all 
been killed. But there will be some again in the future. Someone like 
Amartüvshin might reach a state like that. 
 
In this kind of universe, it is not actions of the body and the tongue that are first and foremost 
subject to moral scrutiny, but the state of the mind. What counts, even for novice practitioners 
like Mönherdene, Gansüh and the others, is the extent to which they try to dissolve 
conceptual dualities. When they get accused of disregarding other beings during mining, it is 
for them an accusation which reduces all action to only that of the body. It is an accusation, 
which privileges the visible and material body as the primary, if not only, locus of agency and 
overlooks the importance of human consciousness. Since it is by virtue of our consciousness 
that we can reflect on how we live our lives in the present, on how we reside together with 
other beings, their creative application of Yogācāra doctrine can be seen to offer the mining 
lamas a greater range of permissive actions than currently available to the other lamas. They 
have created a new and unexpected space within which they justify seemingly unwholesome 
bodily actions by claiming to hold non-objectifying thoughts. 
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Conclusion 
In the remote mountains of Mongolia, a group of village lamas have turned to new devotional 
practices that differ markedly from the orientation of their monastery. Drawing on historical 
connections and personal relations that extend far beyond national borders, the lam uurhaich 
engage passionately and innovatively with classic scriptures that offer a competing way of 
knowing the world. In the absence of local teachers who can offer guidance and instructions, 
the young devotees explore novel convergences between the doctrine and their work in the 
mines. Since the soteriological path of Yogācāra requires a deep and critical venture into the 
realm of consciousness, its followers present a radical reinterpretation of human action and its 
ethics. Rather than seeing gold mining as an act of violent confrontation with and greedy theft 
from other beings, the mining lamas claim that their method of meditation has made a 
different world knowable. As they excavate and haul the gold-rich dirt, their bodily actions 
may appear similar to those of any other miner. But for them, the totality within which they 
conceptualize their own actions is significantly different. As they see the land folding under 
their machinery and they encourage lus to share the riches, the devotees remind us that their 
way of understanding the world is not simply a trivial matter of description or secondary 
elaboration. Instead, it constitutes the very condition for self-understanding and other-relating. 
It is, for them, the realm within which ethical judgment becomes an actual possibility. 
 
This turn to new devotional practices is centrally linked to the material and economic 
aspirations afforded by the Mongolian gold rush. In a region of limited income opportunities, 
gold mining has suddenly brought unprecedented amounts of wealth within reach of its 
various residents. Bringing celebrity ‘high sutra lamas’ like Amartüvshin to this distant 
village, welcoming them with large prayer ceremonies and lavish celebrations, the booming 
gold wealth has also enabled younger lamas to continue their poorly paid monastic practice. 
By recognizing this economic reality, we should, however, not underestimate the existential 
dimensions of devotional practice. As Mönherdene, Gansüh and the others have 
demonstrated, ‘breaking the mind’ is as much about their generation of karma, their place in 
the universe, their dualist mind, as about anything else. Meticulously engaging multiple 
projects, they demonstrate how local religious practice exceeds its basic instrumentality. 
When we take seriously their engagement with Buddhist metaphysics and attend to their own 
ruminations, we can see how the teachings become imbricated with the devotees’ own 
material, ethical, and philosophical undertakings. And we can also see how questions of ethics 
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hinge on culturally meaningful ways of conceptualizing actions that take place in a universe 
that we cannot presume to already know. 
 
Rather than arguing that the epistemological underpinnings of human life are so at odds as to 
be “incommensurable” (Povinelli 2001), I have in this article shown that we should give them 
due attention. For a discipline that seeks to understand what it means to be human, it is 
necessary to engage questions of ‘what it is to know’ (Toren and Pina-Cabral 2009). Cheryl 
Mattingly (2012) has recently urged that anthropologists interested in understanding ethical 
life should pause for a moment and reflect on their theoretical presuppositions. Depending on 
such presuppositions, questions of epistemology can risk getting pushed into the background 
and not appear as important to the human condition as experienced by the people we seek to 
understand. As she notes, anthropologists have “been more comfortable with explanatory 
frameworks that emphasize the social and structural” (2012:179, see also Robbins 2007:295). 
With a theoretical proclivity for social structure and relational analysis, anthropological 
studies of ethics have remained firmly within a “sociological imagination” (Mills 2000, cf. 
Yan 2011) that sees social interaction as the presumed and exclusive locus of ethical 
judgment and experience. But why draw on theoretical frameworks that value the social to 
such an extent that it is accorded a universality and primacy that leaves little analytical space 
for individual self-reflection? 
 
I wonder if this proclivity is a response to an unease with the long-standing and influential 
tradition of moral philosophy and a view that “philosophers..do not concern themselves with 
locating the moral subject within social and cultural worlds” (Howell 1997:7). Is it because 
we assume that in order for us to make sense of those forms of action that do not disclose 
themselves primarily through social relations and human speech, we must draw on atomistic 
theories of moral action? Is it because an attempt to understand people’s self-reflection is 
feared to edge closer to a moral philosophy interested in pure and abstracted reason? Or is it 
maybe because anthropologists have taken to heart insights from psychology and cognitive 
sciences that people’s “self-knowledge is limited and untrustworthy” (Keane 2010:66)? That 
Descartes’s trust in our faculty for reasoning and self-skepticism is proven limited, thus 
rendering human self-understanding, lest disclosed through speech acts and other forms of 
social interaction, an irrelevant element for analysis? As a celebration of the relational basis of 
social theory (cf. Yarrow et al. 2015), this ‘sociological imagination’ privileges socially 
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mediated action as the more reliable, if not objectifiable, realm within which human ethical 
self-formation occurs. 
 
But this accent on the social, where humans become “surfaces to one another” and externalize 
themselves “in an objective form” (Keane 2010:69, 81), risks reproducing the deep and 
perhaps deepening separation of thought from action that Arendt (1958) saw as the besetting 
problem of the modern age. Attaching value to truth and objectivity, ‘contemplation’ becomes 
deceptive whereas ‘making’ becomes the grounds for experiments and observation. We 
should be wary of participating in these modernity projects when seeking to understand 
human encounters, unless we are willing to admit that we either see a concept of truth to 
underlie our disciplinary endeavors or agree to the demise of human contemplation. This is an 
ethical question crucial not only for Mongolia’s mining lamas but for us all. 
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1
 Alongside Durkheim, these works also identify other scholarly legacies as burdens. Lambek discusses how 
Boas’s “often-compelling identification of particular cultural values produced overly homogenous and bounded 
portraits, objectifying both individual values and the cultures they composed” (2010b:13, see also Fassin 
2008:337) while Laidlaw highlights how, in Kantian ethics, “it is impossible… to see how specifically ethical 
considerations might be distinguishable” (2002:315). 
2
 Although Lambek does give attention to issues of judgment, his interest in the relation of speakers to their 
words makes him approach judgment exclusively as part of social interaction and performance. Arendt, in 
contrast, develops roughly two conceptual models: Judging as a faculty of politically engaged actors who judge 
in order to act, and judging as a contemplative self-reflexive faculty of non-participating spectators who judge in 
order to cull meaning from the past. For Arendt (1978a, 1982), judgment is thus coeval with understanding, 
imagination and reconciliation – actions that do not necessarily rely on the spoken word. 
3 This is not to say that I do not recognise the importance of interaction and the spoken word when 
interlocutors later tell the anthropologist about their thoughts. However, although the enterprise of 
anthropology is premised on such dialogues to accompany observations and participations, this subsequent 
dialogue between interlocutor and anthropologist should not render insignificant people’s initial 
contemplative actions. 
4
 The Sanskrit word ‘Dharma’ is derived from the root ‘dhŗ’ which means ‘to carry’, ‘to uphold’ or ‘to support’. 
In Buddhist terminology, it has various meanings ranging from the state of Nature “as it is” (Pa. yathā bhutā) to 
the teachings of the Buddha. 
5
 A version of this story is recounted by Buddha in Bālapaṇḍita Sutta “Fools and Wise Men” in Majjhima 
Nikāya (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001:1016-1028). Buddha tells this story in order to convey to his followers how 
long it will take to regain a human bodily state from the realms of hell. 
6
 In Uyanga the most commonly used word with a meaning equivalent to the English term ‘volition’ is 
zorilgoor.  This expression is in the instrumental case and can be translated as ‘with an aim’, ‘with a goal’, ‘with 
a purpose’, thus used in expressions like zorilgoor hiisen üil (‘an act done with a purpose’). Another word that is 
commonly used among the laity is sanaatai. This expression is in the comitative case and can be translated as 
‘with mind’, ‘with thoughts’. 
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7
 The Mongolian word samadi is a loan word from the Sanskrit and Pāli samādhi, which can be translated 
literally as ‘a putting or joining together’ or ‘to acquire integration or wholeness’. It denotes a state of meditative 
absorption or concentration. 
8
 In establishing a critical distance to scriptures and teachers, Buddha is not rejecting the importance of his own 
teachings but rather showing the villagers its ‘inherently true basis’. 
9
 In referring to a lama as ‘senior’, I am not implying a greater progression along the path of liberation from 
suffering and achieving Enlightenment. Rather in a region where many members of the monastic community do 
not observe even the basic Five Precepts (Pa. pañcaśīlāni), the older the lama, the more senior and higher paid 
he is likely to be – almost regardless of his abilities to study scriptures, engage in devotional practice, or 
cultivate higher wisdom. Approaching seniority largely in terms of age is in continuation with the broader 
regional practice of patriarchal social organization. 
10
 See specifically Compendium of Conduct in Shantideva’s Śiksā-Samuccaya (“Training Anthology”) and 
Stages of the Bodhisattva and Sutra on Skilful Means in Asanga’s Mahāyāna-Saṃgraha (“Summary of the 
Mahāyāna”). 
11
 The Mongolian verb nomhotgoh is usually translated as ‘to tame’, ‘to pacify’. It can also be translated as ‘to 
break’ in the sense of breaking horses, camels, etc. 
